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Water main break discussion

I came across the APEGA report from last year that summarizes the timeline of past work/assessments

Screenshot 2026-01-05 at 11.26.20 AM.png

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I'm sure it's not necessarily the case, but this implies that the water dept. hadn't given much if any thought to system vulnerability until about 2011.

Glenmore was first built in the 30s with major expansions in '57 and '65 (and some more recently with more planned). Bearspaw dam was built in '54 but I don't think the treatment plant was built until 1972. So I'd speculate that dealing with aging infrastructure related to Glenmore was probably a bigger priority than Bearspaw stuff.

I don't think it's unreasonable that they didn't know what they didn't know about this feedermain, and 'finding out' is much easier said than done. But once they realized how much they didn't know I think the failure was failing to get ahead on other infrastructure to the north. Reading some stuff from the early 2020s they had lots of stuff planned, but they were of the mindset that growth/development had to trigger the projects (presumably because of how off-site levies help pay for everything).

Most other infrastructure has more local affects in terms of right-sizing/right-timing and the indirect overall system benefits are a lot less critical. Potable water probably has more flexibility in how it can be routed/distributed than things like electrical or waste water (ie. new projects don't add as much redudancy)? I can see how this mindset makes sense in most other facets of the city and how it may have shaped governance philosophy into missed opportunities.
 
I came across the APEGA report from last year that summarizes the timeline of past work/assessments

I'm sure it's not necessarily the case, but this implies that the water dept. hadn't given much if any thought to system vulnerability until about 2011.
My interpretation is that doing a vulnerability assessment is a specific formal study type; that doesn't mean that nobody's ever thought about vulnerability before.

In the same way project management is a set of techniques that started being done about 110 years ago (first Gantt chart for example) and more completely maybe 75 years ago. But people built the Pyramids, the Great Wall, Notre Dame, Chichen Itza; it's not that these were completely unmanaged projects that produced amazing results through sheer luck, rather they were managed in less formal or less recognized ways using techniques some of which were later formalized into a specific area of practice.

The council report that darwink linked to above (appendix 5) had this interesting map of the mains:
1767655507543.png

Which shows a few interesting things to me; the first is how massive this feedermain is relative to all of the others in the city. And the second is how unappealing alternate main routes are; the north feeder they are building involves pumping water up and over the biggest hill in the city, which can't be cheap. The only route that makes sense from Bearspaw to most of the rest of the city is along this feedermain, so the primary benefit of a second line is redundancy.

Also, while I'm cutting and pasting:
1767655796807.png

Apparently the highest single-day demand for water in the city (blue line) was in 1985, despite the fact that we've gone from 600K to 1500K population since then. Which also suggests that the core infrastructure didn't really need any expansion, so focusing on servicing new communities is the main goal -- unless a 100 year pipe breaks in 50 years, but we simply can't afford to build infrastructure assuming that it is half as good as we think it is.
 
Good thing the lady dipshit premier is blaming Nenshi almost single handedly for this...
I thought this was an own goal for Smith, my read is most people seem to understand the pipe just didn't last as long as it should have. Normally people look for someone to blame and maybe I'm misreading the situation but people seem to have accepted that shit happens.
 
My interpretation is that doing a vulnerability assessment is a specific formal study type; that doesn't mean that nobody's ever thought about vulnerability before.
There was more than just that one sentence that gave me the impression (but that summary is the first thing I read so it may have planted a false seed in my head. Like that 2011 vulnerability assessment was specifically about climate change - which covers a ton of threats, but probably didn't factor stuff like road salt. I would also think it's natural to think more about moving parts at pump stations and treatment plants than linear pipes.

Also, while I'm cutting and pasting:
View attachment 706984
Apparently the highest single-day demand for water in the city (blue line) was in 1985, despite the fact that we've gone from 600K to 1500K population since then. Which also suggests that the core infrastructure didn't really need any expansion, so focusing on servicing new communities is the main goal -- unless a 100 year pipe breaks in 50 years, but we simply can't afford to build infrastructure assuming that it is half as good as we think it is.
This is nuts and I don't know how to wrap my head around it. Maybe all the golf courses in the city were using potable water? I think a bunch of parks sprinklers run off stormwater now...maybe that wasn't always the case?

Interesting article showing the size and age of water mains around the city.

This is super cool - there is a 1.65M pipe heading SE from Glenmore under the river below that dam that was replaced in 2017, and was presumably one of the high-risk+high-impact pipes alluded to in the APEGA report.

Interesting that there's a 0.9M concrete pipe from 1931 running NE from Glenmore, under the river and country club, along 50th Ave and then up Macleod to Spiller Road and on to Ramsay.
 
This is nuts and I don't know how to wrap my head around it. Maybe all the golf courses in the city were using potable water? I think a bunch of parks sprinklers run off stormwater now...maybe that wasn't always the case?
The city had/has an incentive program to nudge people to low flow fixtures. Then, the city banned driveway car washing, and required car washes to reuse water. They raised prices to reflect costs. watering your lawn is expensive. Plenty of older facilities have their own water licenses and structures, so don't use city water (UCalgary for irrigation, Lake Bonavista for the lake (but it might be defunct?? are two I know of, there are likely many others)
 
Most important parts to me.

"In the absence of a single accountable executive, decisions were often delayed or deprioritized, compounded by a consensus-driven culture that normalized deferral of action on critical issues.”

“Ultimately, the Panel recommends a model wherein the Water Utility would become a separate legal entity wholly owned by The City, governed by an independent expert Board of Directors, and maintaining public accountability through City ownership,” it read.

“The WUOB will be independent of the potential politicization of decision-making, which can be misaligned with the long-range planning and funding needed for the Water Utility.”


Not impowering non-executive decision making is something I've come across in my work. People are afraid to make a big decision and tend to pass it up the chain where the importance can get watered down because of multiple streams (pardon the pun) of big decision escalation.

Also, politicized decision-making misaligned with the long-range planning and funding needed is exactly the problem with how we (Canadian governments (municipal, provincial, and federal)) have ended up with massive infrastructure and services debts. I specifically, because it is something I use every day, think about Transit when I think about this but there are many other examples where political decisions get in the way of the best infrastructure/service.
 
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Most important parts to me.

"In the absence of a single accountable executive, decisions were often delayed or deprioritized, compounded by a consensus-driven culture that normalized deferral of action on critical issues.”

“Ultimately, the Panel recommends a model wherein the Water Utility would become a separate legal entity wholly owned by The City, governed by an independent expert Board of Directors, and maintaining public accountability through City ownership,” it read.

“The WUOB will be independent of the potential politicization of decision-making, which can be misaligned with the long-range planning and funding needed for the Water Utility.”


Not impowering non-executive decision making is something I've come across in my work. People are afraid to make a big decision and tend to pass it up the chain where the importance can get watered down because of multiple streams (pardon the pun) of big decision escalation.

Also, politicized decision-making misaligned with the long-range planning and funding needed is exactly the problem with how we (Canadian governments (municipal, provincial, and federal)) have ended up with massive infrastructure and services debts. I specifically, because it is something I use every day, think about Transit when I think about this but there are many other examples where political decisions get in the way of the best infrastructure/service.
Sounds like an Enmax model for water. I think it's easy to blame politicized decisions, and it's easy for the report to blame funding other things and not prioritizing the water main, but much like the criticism of opposition politicians, they have to say what they'd cut.

We spent a lot of money on flood mitigation after the 2013 floods, we spent a lot on the arena, we spent a lot on downtown revitalization, we spent a lot on the Green Line, and so on. What should we have cut, to replace this water main? Bear in mind, nothing has broken at this point when the funding decision was made. If we funded all of our infrastructure deficit and keep it i top shape, there probably isn't money left for any of the nice to haves, and are we ok to live without residential conversion incentives, the arena, soccer domes, etc.
 
Sounds like an Enmax model for water. I think it's easy to blame politicized decisions, and it's easy for the report to blame funding other things and not prioritizing the water main, but much like the criticism of opposition politicians, they have to say what they'd cut.

We spent a lot of money on flood mitigation after the 2013 floods, we spent a lot on the arena, we spent a lot on downtown revitalization, we spent a lot on the Green Line, and so on. What should we have cut, to replace this water main? Bear in mind, nothing has broken at this point when the funding decision was made. If we funded all of our infrastructure deficit and keep it i top shape, there probably isn't money left for any of the nice to haves, and are we ok to live without residential conversion incentives, the arena, soccer domes, etc.
Unless things change for how cities are funded, we have to learn to live without as many nice to haves. Personally, I think things need to change with how cities are funded.
 
Unless things change for how cities are funded, we have to learn to live without as many nice to haves. Personally, I think things need to change with how cities are funded.
We have a watermain that failed prematurely, and after failing, we are actively planning a replacement steel pipe or twinning it, and a further rupture causes a two week disruption (based on current city timelines). Even in the summer of 2024, we didn't run out of water, we had to take shorter showers, stop watering our lawns. I'm personally in favour of these nice to haves, especially things like recreation facilities, if it meant we have to permanent reduce our water consumption with higher fees or more curbs on lawn watering.
 
Unless things change for how cities are funded, we have to learn to live without as many nice to haves. Personally, I think things need to change with how cities are funded.
Local government own source revenue is at the lowest point in 25 years in Canada (down to 2.9% of GDP in 2023) mostly because cities refuse to use the tools they have. If they grew taxes at the rate of economic growth to the average revenue from 2009-2019 (3.3% of GDP), they'd have 15% more revenue. Giving them different tools doesn't help. All across the country cities refuse to use entire classes of revenue tools because of extreme tax aversion.

Elected officials seem paralyzed and unable to justify the revenues needed to sustain cities let alone fulfill their visions.

Cities used pandemic era relief to raise taxes less than they otherwise would have and act like that relief should have been the dawn of a new era of funding from other levels of government.

Cities want revenue without accountability around how it is generated directly, and without accountability to governments that might supply that revenue over how it is spent.

They have done a very good job complaining.

Edit:
Here is a graph (transfers are at an all time high outside of recessions, while local taxes and local fees/utilities/debt (other revenue) has dropped off):
1767828349384.png
 
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Sounds like an Enmax model for water. I think it's easy to blame politicized decisions, and it's easy for the report to blame funding other things and not prioritizing the water main, but much like the criticism of opposition politicians, they have to say what they'd cut.

We spent a lot of money on flood mitigation after the 2013 floods, we spent a lot on the arena, we spent a lot on downtown revitalization, we spent a lot on the Green Line, and so on. What should we have cut, to replace this water main? Bear in mind, nothing has broken at this point when the funding decision was made. If we funded all of our infrastructure deficit and keep it i top shape, there probably isn't money left for any of the nice to haves, and are we ok to live without residential conversion incentives, the arena, soccer domes, etc.
I think that's why some major infrastructure systems like transit and water - once they reach a certain scale - really need to be converted into a regulated utility type structure with a dedicated tax/fee support structure and mandate that can better resist the pressure of short-term and political thinking. They are too big, too complex and too important to be left to political whims and influence of the issue of the day.

They really need a long-range, sustained thinking that can resist short-term investment. The scale of the water system grew so complex it became really challenging for anyone to guide the overall objectives - so drift over time was inevitable. Some years maintenance won out, other years growth, other years repaying the depleted reserves etc. it's all really tactical responding to issues of the day, not really the multi-decade long sustained focus that is required to keep up with such a large and complex network.

For example, if the water utility had more authority with a clear mandate to ensure system reliability, redundancy and maintenance, and was given more control to set rates, fees and levies to execute, they probably would have pushed far harder back against Council planning decisions that create the graph below.


1767825576593.png
 

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