lemongrab
Active Member
I came across the APEGA report from last year that summarizes the timeline of past work/assessments
I'm sure it's not necessarily the case, but this implies that the water dept. hadn't given much if any thought to system vulnerability until about 2011.
Glenmore was first built in the 30s with major expansions in '57 and '65 (and some more recently with more planned). Bearspaw dam was built in '54 but I don't think the treatment plant was built until 1972. So I'd speculate that dealing with aging infrastructure related to Glenmore was probably a bigger priority than Bearspaw stuff.
I don't think it's unreasonable that they didn't know what they didn't know about this feedermain, and 'finding out' is much easier said than done. But once they realized how much they didn't know I think the failure was failing to get ahead on other infrastructure to the north. Reading some stuff from the early 2020s they had lots of stuff planned, but they were of the mindset that growth/development had to trigger the projects (presumably because of how off-site levies help pay for everything).
Most other infrastructure has more local affects in terms of right-sizing/right-timing and the indirect overall system benefits are a lot less critical. Potable water probably has more flexibility in how it can be routed/distributed than things like electrical or waste water (ie. new projects don't add as much redudancy)? I can see how this mindset makes sense in most other facets of the city and how it may have shaped governance philosophy into missed opportunities.
I'm sure it's not necessarily the case, but this implies that the water dept. hadn't given much if any thought to system vulnerability until about 2011.
Glenmore was first built in the 30s with major expansions in '57 and '65 (and some more recently with more planned). Bearspaw dam was built in '54 but I don't think the treatment plant was built until 1972. So I'd speculate that dealing with aging infrastructure related to Glenmore was probably a bigger priority than Bearspaw stuff.
I don't think it's unreasonable that they didn't know what they didn't know about this feedermain, and 'finding out' is much easier said than done. But once they realized how much they didn't know I think the failure was failing to get ahead on other infrastructure to the north. Reading some stuff from the early 2020s they had lots of stuff planned, but they were of the mindset that growth/development had to trigger the projects (presumably because of how off-site levies help pay for everything).
Most other infrastructure has more local affects in terms of right-sizing/right-timing and the indirect overall system benefits are a lot less critical. Potable water probably has more flexibility in how it can be routed/distributed than things like electrical or waste water (ie. new projects don't add as much redudancy)? I can see how this mindset makes sense in most other facets of the city and how it may have shaped governance philosophy into missed opportunities.




